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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
PRICE-OREM INVESTMENT
COMPANY, a limited partnership,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
NO. 19096

vs.
ROLLINS, BROWN & GUNNELL,
INC.,
Defendant-Respondent.

APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT COURT, UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
HONORABLE MAURICE HARDING, JUDGE, and
HONORABLE DAVID SAM, JUDGE, presiding.
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for damages resulting from the mis-staking
of property owned by the plaintiff.
DISPOSITION IN TRIAL COURT
This matter was tried to a jury, Maurice Harding,
Judge pro tern,

presiding, on November 17-19, 1980.

District

The jury re-

a verdict for the plaintiff and assessed damages of
$30,UOO.OU.

R.101,

107.

Judge Harding subsequently granted the

-1-

defendant's motion for a new trial.
set for trial,

before David Sam,

At the time set for trial,
John Price Associates,

R. 14 0.

District Judge,

the court ruled,

I:lc.,

0'.1 Marcl1 l,

sua spo:1te,

that

the party with whom the defeCJdinr

had contracted, was an i'1dispensable party,

and ordered that

the case be dismissed unless the plai:ltiff amended its compla:to add John Price Associates,
to the action.

R.147-48.

Inc., as an i'1dispensable party

The plaintiff elected :lot to ame1d

the complaint, and the action was therefore dismissed.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent urges that the trial court's decisio'.1 be
affirmed in all respects.

If,

however,

this court determiCJes

that the trial court's decision should be reversed,

the matter

should be remanded for a new trial on all issues.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Sometime during the first part of July,
Associates,

Inc.,

1973, John Price

(JPA), contracted with the defe:lda:-it t11 have

survey done of the site of the Orem Plaza, a shoppi:1g ce:lter
owned and developed by Price-Orem I:1vestme:1t Compa:1y,
partnership.

R.183,

192, 210.

I:lc.

R.192,

208.

Joh:-i

the i'1dividual, was the sole ge:1eral part:ler of Price-

Orem Investment Company.

The limited part:lers wete

corporations of Joh'.1 Price.

R.207.

Age:lts •Jt

the dete'.1da'.1t

performed the survey i'.1 accorda:lce with the terms nt
tract.

lim1te'

The shoppi:1g ce:lter was coCJ-

structed by John Price Associates,
Price,

a

R. 319.

-2-

the cn1-

slaKe

the layuut of the shopping center building.

l)J.

Mr.

R.

209-11,

Brown, a c0nsultin•J enyineer and a principal of

the defendant,

testified that the starting point for staking

the layout of a building is usually furnished by the building
owner.

R.

3 7 5.

Mr. Thurgood,

the engineer in charge of the

surveying crew which staked the building layout,
with Mr. Marshall,

R.

322, met

the JOb super intendant for the plaintiff,

prior to performing thee staking.

R. 410.

Mr. Marshall had

already prepared the base for the structure upon which the staking was to be laid out.

The base consisted of a gravel bed

which had been located from a stake which Marshall had selected
as a starting point.

R.

421,

Mr. Thurgood confirmed

426.

measurements from a starting point stake labeled

"".w.

property corner."

served,

R.

The stake had been well pre-

41 3.

and was marked off by flagging and other stakes around

it, R. 413-15, and there was other evidence that at least two
other persons had used that stake as the northwest property
corner.

R.

426.

Based on that starting point, Mr. Thurgood

and h1s crew staked the building layout.

R. 416.

The build-

ing layout as staked fit properly on top of fill material
which had already been placed Dy JPA.
'1r.
stak1nrd

the bt11l 1111'-1

Tcitccr
n('t

s11r-l<..;t:>

421,

254-55.

rhur1ci«cJ t•cst1t1eci that the procedures he used in

;111·r1t

in accL1rdance with the custom

layc-iut were
R.

. . . ,1:-;

R.

4 2 4.

c'ven ,,_,,µd]c'd tl1dt Ll1e stake used by Mr. Thurgood
'--'nrrier

ir1lt:>nded
·"''-';u1s1t

the

tJ'y'
i,1n

·w3s

-3-

owner which by reason of the
about

30 feet

to

the north.

R.

414.

As a result,

the building was staked about thirty t-.

south of the location called for on the site plan.
The problem resulted from these facts.
the plaintiff,

In July ot

197 J,

by purchase order, employed the defendant tc
The defendant

survey the boundaries of plaintiff's property.

made the survey but it was determined that the deed line and
fence line did not fit.

The plaintiff,

acquired additional property north of

therefore,

its fence

by neqotiat1
Plaint1::

line.

then tore down the fence and graded the property north of the
fence line shown on the survey.

(See Exhibit 4).

The fact

that such additional property was acquired and which moved the
plaintiff's property north some thirty feet was never revealed
to the plaintiff.

R.

to do the staking,

he did not take the survey documents with

260.

When Mr.

Thurgood went to the site

him, believing that he was merely to lay out the construction
grid at the place selected by the plaintiff.
grid,

so far as he was concerned,

although he did talk with Mr.

R.

423-24.

had no bearing on the

Marshall as to how he had

the location and inspected the stake labeled "N.W.
corner."

R.

That

property

415-16.

When Mr. Thurgood discovered the error,
superiors and notified the plaintiff.

R.

he notified his

418-19.

Mr.

Brown

testified that he inspected the property about the f 1 rst
September, 1973, R.

328-30, and noteri what asµects ut

tion had been completed at that time.

R.

333.

that the total amount of concrete µoured at
about thirty-eight cubic yards in the
one hundred fifty-three yarrJs

tr)ul

in tt1,, sl.1t''-'·

-4-

p.

c<>nstn.

He est 1mdt,_>,

tr1,it

111,;s

,,t

t

.Ji1'1

11ne \·1a'°
JCn

1Jt

observed that no electrical work and very little plumbing had
Mr.

R.337,

been installed.

Brown then developed two pro-

posals for correcting the mislocation of the building.

R.336.

He estimated that the corrections would cost about three
thousand dollars,
complete.
Mr.

R.340, and would take about ten days to

R. 341.
Brown's suggestions and other suggestions for correct-

ing the problem were presented to Mr.
September 13, 1974.
matter,

Price at a meeting on

The original complaint in this

R.341.

seeking $825,000.00 in damages,

days earlier.

R.436.

Mr.

had been filed a few

Price did not give serious con-

sideration to any of the defendant's proposals,
dismissed each one.

R.341-44, 437.

but summarily

JPA redesigned the

building to shorten it by thirty feet,

R.204, and sought to

recover for the resulting loss of twenty one hundred square
feet.
Substantial competent evidence was presented concerning
the amount of parking required for the complex.
Brown, who spent his full

Both Mr.

time as a consulting engineer for

Orem City and was famllcar with the ordinances relating to
shopplng center construction, R.349,

and Mr.

Deschamps,

the

p!a·n:-iJ director for Orem City durc<g the relevant time
[Jer'."d,

P.389,

testified that 596 parkieig spaces were re-

1uired for the shoppincJ complex as fieially coc.structed.

_c_

R,360, 397.

The number of parking spaces actually provided,

however, was only 490.

See also R.401.

The matter was submitted to the jury, which returned a
verdict for the plaintiff and assessed the damages of thirty
thousand dollars.

R.101.

The defendant moved for Judgment

N.O.V., or in the alternative for a remittitur or a new
trial, R.126, and the court granted a new trial.

R.140.

The plaintiff then moved for reconsideration of the grant
of a new trial, and the defendant moved to amend its answer.
On May 15, 1981, the court granted the defendant's motion
to amend, denied the plaintiff's motion to reconsider, and
reaffirmed its grant of a new trial,

stating as the basis

therefor that "the damages were excessive" and that there
was "no culpable negligence on the part of the engineers."
Prior to the second trial this defendant was allowed
to file an amended answer wherein it denied any mis-staking
and among other defenses alleged the failure to join real
parties in interest.
The new trial was scheduled before Judge David Sam on
March 1, 1983.

On the suggestion of the defendant,

court ruled, sua sponte, that John Price Associates,

the
Inc.,

was a necessary and indispensable party to the action.

The

court ordered that the plaintiff could amend its complaint
within ten days, or the action would be dismissed.

R.147-4Y.

The plaintiff elected not to amend, and thereafter perfected
its appeal.

R.150.

-h-

A R G U M E N T
POINT I
SUBSTANTIAL COMPETENT EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED
WHICH WOULD SUPPORT A VERDICT FOR THE DEFENDANT;
THE TRIAL COURT'S GRANT OF A NEW TRIAL SHOULD
THEREFORE BE AFFIRMED.
After reviewing the trial transcript and two rounds of
briefs submitted by the parties, and after hearing oral arguments on the matter, Judge Maurice Harding determined that
the defendant's motion for a new trial should be granted.

The

reasons given were that the damages were excessive and that
there was no culpable negligence on the part of the defendant.
That decision should be upheld on appeal if the record contains
"substantial competent evidence" which would support a verdict
for the defendant.

Nelson v. Trujillo, 657 P.2d 730 (Utah

1982).
"Substantial competent evidence" is of course not capable
of precise definition.

Dairyland Insurance Co. v.

Holder,

641 P.2d 136 (Utah 1982), supports the inference that any
admissible evidence greater than a mere scintilla constitutes
substantial competent evidence.
Heart Hospital,

62 wash.

See also Helman v. Sacred

2d 136, 381 P.2d 605, 612-13 (1963).

In Utah State Road Commission v. Steele Ranch,

533 P.2d 888

(Utah 19751, the court defined "substantial evidence" as
follows:
In dealing with that problem, we recognize
that neither the trial court, nor this reviewing
court, should trespass upon the prerogative

-7-

of the jury by applying a subjective measure of
our own ideas of "reasonableness" and rejecting as not "substantial" any evidence which fails
to meet that test.
Allowance should be made f ''
the fact that there is a comparatively wide orbit
through which reasonable minds may swing; and
that what may be considered reasonable in the
broad sense need not necessarily fit into the
exact pattern of our own thought.
In the time
honored and universally accepted rule that a finding or verdict must be supported by substantial
evidence, the modifying adjective "substantial"
has been used advisedly to indicate a higher degree of proof than just any evidence of any ki1a.
The requirement is that the evidence must be
sufficient in amount and credibility that, when
considered in connection with the other evidence
and circumstances shown in the case, would Justify
some, but not necessarily all, reasonable minds
acting fairly thereon; to believe it to be the
truth.
And conversely, if when so considered,
the court is convinced that it is so inconsequential, or so clearly lacking in credibility,
that no jury acting fairly and reasonably could
so believe, it cannot properly be regarded as
substantial evidence.
533 P.2d at 890 (emphasis added,

footnotes omitted).

The record in this case clearly contains substantial
tent evidence which would justify a verdict for the defendant.
A.

The Defendant Was Not Negligent.

One of the bases

for the trial court's ruling was that "there was no culpable
negligence on the part of the engineers."

The court's con-

clusion certainly finds substantial supporting competent ev:dence in the record;

indeed,

there is no substantial evidence

to the conti;ary.
The plaintiff states on page 16 of
evidence is undisputed that the

its briet that "[t]ne

[northwest propett/

rebar and wooden stake were placed by the detendant," and
that " [ t] he evidence is 1 ikewise undisputed t
property corner was marked about thirty teet

-

:1dt

the
.t

-1,H

th wee·

Lhc,

The plaintiff

l-id:cated by the survey."
hecause the detendant
m:stake,

then argues that

in :ts original answer admitted making a

the defendant :s l:able for any consequences of that

mistake.
The defendant now denies having made a mistake. Assuming,
arguendo,that a mistake was made,
might be val:d

if

th:s were a contract case,

µarty were the plaintiff.
even

if not negligent,

stoutly maintained,
contract
( R.

(R.

and if the proper

The defendant m:ght then be liable,

for breach of contract.

however,

that

The plaintiffs

its case sounded in tort,

not

192), and it was so treated by the trial court

The plaintiff was,

4 56).

the plaintiff's contention

therefore,

Just that the defendant made a mistake,
was negligent,

required to prove not
but that the defendant

and that the negl:gence proximately caused in-

Jury to the plaint:tf.
Mr.

Thurgood,

the engineer in charge of the survey crew

which staked the building,
with Mr.

Marshall,

test:f ied that he,

the Job superintendant for the plaintiff,

selected a stake marked

"N.W.

Property Corner" as the starting

R.413-16, 428.

po:nt for staking the building.
and Mr.
cause

Mr.

Thurgood

Marshall selected that stake as a starting point be-

it had been set off and

There were several other
urc:rood to '1e l ievP

start:

in conjunction

1,j

,"1:,t,

:;s stakc"1

t

th;:i t

by flagging.

R.413.

ind:cat:ons wh:ch led Mr.
he 1-Ja s

::1clli<1i:1,] the

:tLt',1 ·1eatly o-i

i rig i.vi th

fact

t''P ot

tnat

the correct

the property corners

the f:ll work which had

R.421, 426.
l.CJtµt

t1:,1ll',

c>ve-its revea)e,J tnat
nt

the startiny po:nt used was

the

r1e1.,,

1orthwest property

corner.

R.418. The plaintiff claims that this thirty foot

offset was a result of the defendant's negligence in
to select the correct starting point.

The plaintiff also

apparently argues that the defendant was negligent at a much
earlier stage,

in doing the initial survey of the property

and in placing the survey pegs relied upon by Mr. Thurgood.
The fact is that the plaintiff had already used the "'uunceous
stake for laying out the construction base and all the defendant was required to do by i t.s pur-chase order was to stake
the foundation dimensions.

It was not employed to locate

the foundation upon the plaintiff's property. R.256, ex.

7.

No expert testimony (or other evidence) was presented
by the plaintiff concerning the standards of care applicable
to the surveying and engineering professions.

The standard

of care required for a surveyor is not within the common
knowledge of lay persons, and expert testimony on the subject
was therefor-e necessary to establish a prima facie case of
negligence.

National Housing Industries,

Development Co., 118 Ariz.
1978); Carter & Company,
Ct. App. 1968).

Inc. v.

E.L. Jones

374, 576 P.2d 1374 (Ct. App.

Inc. v.

McGee, 213 so.

See also Marsh v.

2d 89 (La.

Pemberton, 10 Utah 2d 40,

347 P.2d 1108 (1959).
Mr. Thurgood, an expert witness qualified to testify

01

the subject, testified for the defendant that the procedures
that he used to stake the building were correct (R.424), anJ
that,

if presented with the same situation again,

perform the staking exactly as he did the first

- ) I)-

he would

time.

R. 4 2 b.

With the exception of Mr. Price's argumentative outburst, that
there was "no engineer in the world that would stake out a
building without a survey"

(R. 258), there was no evidence

that the survey was not performed with due care in accordance
with established surveying techniques, or that it was in any
other respect negligently performed.
In addition, there was also evidence from which reasonable
minds could have concluded that, arguendo, regardless of any
alleged problems with the initial survey, the ultimate misstaking was the proximate result of the plaintiff's failure
to preserve all the stakes from the initial survey, or that
the plaintiff had itself mislocated its foundation or had consented and approved the use of the "incorrect" stake for that
purpose.

R. 413-15, 418 ( 1. 22-24), 426.

There was no evi-

dence as to whether the stake marking the correct northwest
property corner was still in existence at the time Mr.
Thurgood performed the staking of the building grid. Mr.
Thurgood testified he observed nothing in the area of the
correct northwest corner.

R.415.

Where the plaintiff presented no expert testimony as
to the appropriate standard of care, and where there was substantial evidence from which a jury could have concluded that
misstaking,

if any, was not the defendant's fault,

the trial

court's grant of a new trial must be upheld.
B.

The Plaintiff Failed To Mitigate Its Damages.

The

other yround given by the trial court for its grant of a new
trial was that the damayes were excessive.

-11-

The jury awarded

damages of $30,000.00.

The trial court apparently made this

ruling either because it was convinced that the plaintiff
had failed to mitigate its damages, or that the plaintiff
simply did not suffer that great of damage.

The latter

issue will be addressed in subparagraph "C" of this Point.
The defendant presented evidence that, at the time the
error was discovered,

in July 1974, the costs of correcting

the error would have been approximately $3,000.00, and that
repairs would have taken approximately ten days to complete.
R.340-41.

This proposed repair essentially involved

the building about thirty feet •to the north, removing some of
the concrete which had been poured, and pouring an additional
pad of concrete on the north end of the building.

R.336.

The testimony concerning the costs of repair was given by
Mr. Brown, who was a consulting engineer and who regularly
designed buildings and did cost estimates.

R.315, 339.

This proposal, along with several others, was presented
to Mr. Price, the principal of the plaintiff, on September
13, 1974. The plaintiff had commenced this action, seeking
damages of $895,000.00, a few days earlier, on September 9.
R.220, 328, 436. At the September 13 meeting, Mr. Price summar: ..
dismissed each of the proposals of the defendant, R.437,
341-44, and proceeded at full steam to build the shopping
center, making no other effort to mitigate the damages.
The plaintiff objected to the evidence concerning the
cost of correcting the error at the time it was discovered,
contending that the defendant had not pleaded the plaintiff's

-l2-

failure to mitigate damages as a'1 affirmative defense, and
had therefore waived that defense.

A similar issue was

addressed by this court in Cheney v. Rucker, 14 Utah 2d 205,
381 P.2d 86 (1963).

Justice Crockett, speaking for the court

in that case, comrne'1ted as follows:
Plaintiff also raises the procedural point
that since defendants did not plead the subsequent agreement as an affirmative defense, they
should not have been permitted to rely thereon.
It is true, as plaintiff insists, that Rule 8(c),
U.R.C.P., requires that affirmative defenses be
pleaded.
It is a good rule whose purpose is to
have the issues to be tried clearly framed.
But
it is not the only rule in the book of Rules of
Civil Procedure.
They must all be looked to in
the light of their even more fundamental purpose
of liberalizing both pleading and procedure to
the end that parties are afforded the privilege
of presenting whatever legitimate contentions
they have pertaining to their dispute.
What they
are entitled to is notice of the issues raised
and an opportunity to meet them.
When this is
accomplished, that is all that is required.
Our
rules provide for liberality to allow examination into and settlement of all issues bearing
upon the controversy, but safeguard the rights of
the other party to have a reasonable time to meet
a new issue if he so requests.
Rule lS(b), U.R.C.P., so states.
It further allows for an amendment to conform to the proof after trial or even
after judgment, and indicates that if the ends
of justice so require, "failure so to amend does
'10t affect the result of the trial of these issues."
This idea is confirmed by Rule 54(c)(l), U.R.C.P.:
"(E]very final judgment shall grant the relief
to which the party in whose favor it is rendered
is entitled, even if the party has not demanded
such relief in his pleadings."
Although the plaintiff did object to evidence
on the issue of subsequent agreement, when it was
overruled, he made no request for a continuance
nor did he make any representation to the court
that he was take" by surprise or otherwise at a
in meeting that issue.
The trial
court not only did not abuse his discretion in
allowi'1g the issue to be raised a'1d receivi'1g the
contract in evide:1ce, but he would have failed
the plai'1 ma'1date of justice had he refused to do
so.
-13-

381 P.2d at 91

(emphasis added,

See also

footnote omitted).

Williams v. State Farm Insurance Co.,

656 P. 2d 966 (Utah lQf\21.

Rule 8(c) does not specifically list "failure to m1tigat•"
as an affirmative defense,

however, arguendo, even if such were

the case, the plaintiff clearly was aware well in advance of
the trial that the defendant intended to assert that defense.
For example,

in answers to interrogatories submitted to the

plaintiff over three years before the trial, the defendant
stated that it would call witnesses to testify that "the proble·
complained of by the plaintiff could have been eliminated with
a moderate expenditure of time and money."
With good reason,

R. 17-18.

the plaintiff did not claim surprise

or request a continuance as a result of the evidence concerning mitigation, but merely objected because of the procedural
technicality.

The court overruled the objection.

"[Q] uestions

of material and prejudicial variance between pleadings and
proof,

[citation], are peculiarly within the province of the

trial court, and will be reversed only for an abuse ot discretion."

Williams v.

973 (Utah 1982).

State Farm Insurance Co.,

656 P.2d 966,

There is no indication that the court abused

its discretion in allowing proof of the plaintiff's failure
to mitigate its damages.
The plaintiff had a duty to use reasonable care and
diligence to avoid loss and to minimize its damaiJeS.
Perry, 104 Utah 151, 140 P.2d 772,

780 (194JI.

'1orr 1

l'umµetent

evidence established that the off 1cers and
defendant, consulting engineers whu were ext)er1•:t.1._'1·,;

-14-

1t
l

r,

designing such buildings and in estimating the construction
costs, R.339, presented several possible means of curing
the problem to Mr.
each suggestion.

Price.

Mr.

Price summarily dismissed

R.437, 341-44.

The defendant readily acknowledges that the plaintiff
was not required to enter into other risky contracts, incur
unreasonable inconvenience or expense, disorganize its business, or incur other serious harm in the attempt to avoid
harm.

(Plaintiff's brief at 19.) The plaintiff was required,

however,

to take reasonable steps,

in accordance with the

rules of common sense and fair dealing, and to incur necessaEy
trifling expenses, to mitigate the damages.
88 Utah 325, 54 P.2d 425, 428 (1936).

Jankle v. Texas Co.,

"The word 'trifling'

in this connection has reference to the situation of the
parties.

It means a sum which is trifling in comparison with

the consequential damages which the plaintiff is seeking to
recover in the particular case."
§

22 Am. Jur.

2d Damages

32 (1965).
The test, again, on appeal,

is not whether there was

evidence from which a jury could have concluded that the plaintiff
acted reasonably in rejecting the defendant's suggestions for
repair,

but rather whether there was substantial competent

evidence from which a jury could have determined that the plaintiff acted unreasonably in summarily dismissing all suggestions
as to how it might mitigate its damages.

Nelson v. Trujillo,

6S7 P.2d 730 (Utah 1982).
Reasonable Jurors could have concluded, based on the
-15-

evidence presented, and Mr.

Price did not act reasonably,

not use common sense, and did :iot act fairly

in summarily aci.

without ser-ious consideration rejecting each of the defec,da1t'
proposals for repair.

There were no time commitments with re-

spect to the area of the building from which the space was 10s:

R. 250.

The jurors could therefore have also concluded that

3·

extra expense of ten days and $3,000.00 would be a trifliC1g
expense when compared with damages which were claimed at the
time to be $825,000.00, R.436, and which were later claimed
to be at least $83,000.00, R.11.

Jurors could have concludea

that it was not reasonable for Mr. Price to not even ask his
architect to redesign the project to include the lost space.

R.234-35, 250, 277-78.

The trial judge, who heard all the

evidence, determined that a new trial should be granted, aC1d
his decision should be affirmed.
C.

The Plaintiff Suffered No Damages.

Substantial com-

petent evidence was presented at trial that the shopping ceC1te:
as finally constructed, was in violation of Orem City Ordinances,

in that it had too few parking spaces for the amouC1t

of retail and restaurant space.

Although the plaintiff arguea

that it had been deprived of an additional 2100 square feet
of floor space, construction of the additional space would
have been illegal.
It is well-established that an award of damages based
violation of the law is against public policy.

01

There are

:iumerous occasio:is i:i which courts have had aci ''[lpnrtuci: t:; t·.
deal with an illegal use.

O:ie such area

-ln-

:s that

()t-

f::.rn:1C'-1t

domai:i.

It is well-established that any evidence relating

to an unlawful use of the property when condemnation proceedi:igs are instituted is not admissible to prove the value
of the land.

4 Nicholas on Eminent Domain

§

12.3143 (3d ed.

1981). As stated by the Arizona Supreme Court in Gear v. City
of Phoenix, 93 Ariz.

260, 379 P.2d 972 (1972):

If the ordinances are a reasonable exercise of
the City's police power .
. the availability of land for a use which is prohibited
by law cannot be considered in determining its
value in eminent domain proceedings.
379 P.2d at 974 (citations omitted).
In this case, the ordinances of Orem City were established
and the agents and employees of Orem City testified to their
implementation.

In tort, the plaintiff is prohibited from

putting on evidence of damages which result from activities
or situations prohibited by statutes or ordinances.

Further,

illegal contracts cannot be enforced nor can damages be awarded
based upon the implementation or performance which results from
the contract. 17 Am. Jur.

2d Contracts

§

155-73 ( 1964).

The plaintiff attempted to prove damages by establishing
the value of an imaginary 2100 square feet of retail space
which was not constructed and which, if constructed, would
be a patent violation of the Orem City Ordinances.

It is

clear that the plaintiff in fact suffered no damage in the
eyes of the law.
stat1ny that

The trial court was therefore correct in

the damages awarded were excessive, and in

ordering a new trial.
POINT II
JOHN PRICE ASSOCIATES, INC., WAS AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY AND THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION
-17-

TO DISMISS THE ACTION UPON PLAINTIFF'S ELECTION
NOT TO AMEND ITS COMPLAINT WAS PROPER.
To the extent that plaintiff's claim against defendant
sounds in contract, John Price Associates,

Inc.,

(JPA)

is a

necessary and indispensable party, and the trial court was
proper in dismissing the action for plaintiff's failure to
join JPA.
It is undisputed that the only binding contract
the defendant was a purchase order issued by JPA requiring
defendant "to stake building layout with twenty five
foot offsets, stake parking lot and rain water sump.

(25)
Not to

exceed $330.00. Stake curb and gutter not to exceed $270.00.
R. 256, 209-11.

Defendant did not enter into any contract

with plaintiff and was under no contractual duty to plaintiff
to perform the survey.

On the basis of these facts,

there is

simply no privity of contract between plaintiff and defendant,
and there is no way plaintiff can sue on a contract theory
without bringing in JPA.
Rule 17(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires
every action to be prosecuted "in the name of the real party
in interest."

The real party in interest is the party who

has the right to sue under the substantive law applicable
to the case. John Price Associates and the defendant,

Roll:ns, '

Brown, & Gunnell, were the only parties that had privity of
contract; therefore,
Company,

the plaintiff, Price-Orem Investment

is not the real party in interest and it does not

have standing to bri'.lg this actio'.l agai'.lst the detenda'.lt.
The very foundations of contract law prevecit "''-' "'he• :s
-ld-

not a party to a contract from maintaining a suit on it
unless the contract expressly provides that it is for the
benefit of a third party.
in Staley v.

New,

56 N.M.

This fundamental rule is recognized
756, 250 P.2d 893 (1952), wherein

the court held that in absence of a contractual relation
between the owners of a home and the architect who drew up
plans and specifications for a heating system,

the owners

could not sue the architect for breach of contract or warranty
when the system failed to heat the house adequately.

See

also Ekstrom United Supply Co. v. Ash Grove Lime & Portland
Cement Co., 194 Kan.

634,

400 P.2d 707 (1965)

(there is no

privity of contract between a subcontractor and an owner);
Watson v. Aced, 156 Cal. App.

2d 87,

319 P.2d 83 (1957)

(the

general rule is that one may not sue upon contract unless he
is party to that contract).
In its brief, plaintiff claims that a contract existed
between plaintiff and defendant on the grounds that defendant
admitted this fact
ever,

in its pleadings.

This allegation, how-

fails to recognize that following the District Court's

grant of a new trial,

the court granted defendant's motion

to amend its answer.

In the amended answer,

the defendant

set forth as its sixth affirmative defense the fact that the
pla:ntiff is not the real party in interest.

Furthermore, substantial evidence was presented
jnd accepted by the court at the first trial establishing
thdt Jefendant's
T F' .;

d 1 •l

10

'ne

l

to survey the property was with
3

e.

R.

204-11.
-[U-

to this line of questioning, and, therefore, is precluded
from raising that issue on appeal.
As the real party in interest, JPA is a necessary and
indispensable party under Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of C1v1l
Procedure:
(a)
Necessary Joinder.
Subject to the provisions of Rule 23 and subdivision (b) of this Rule,
having a joint interest shall be made
parties and be joined on the same side as plaintiffs or defendants.
When a person who should
join as a plaintiff refuses to do so, or his
consent cannot be obtained, he may be made a
defendant or. in orooer c"ases. an involuntarv
olaintiff.
Plaintiff araues that because JPA was not damaaed it had
no interest with olaintiff and. therefore. is not an ind1soensable or necessarv oartv.

This construction of the

"ioint interest" reauirement. however. is far too narrow and
should not be aoolied.

Incurrina damaae is certainl•; not the

onlv thina that creates a 1oint interst.

if JPA

is the one that contracted with defendant to do the survevinn
and the contract was not oerformed accordina to its terms. JPM
has an interest in enforcing its contract rights.
more, the

Further-

rules, which merely incorporate the case

decisions reached at common law, further support the position
that inasmuch as the plaintiff is suing on contract, JPA is
an "indispensable or necessary" party.

Rule

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states thctt

19(a)
J

·)f

thf'

part; shctll

be joined in an action if:
(1)
in his absence complete relief c1:1r,0t
be accorded among tl1ose alrectd,· ['-'rt1es, .,;:
(2)
he clctims ctn interest rel.1t111< t,
Sul
ject

Of

the

dCtlOrl

disposition of the

-ind

lS

Jcl1•Jn

-,:'.()-

srJ

in

SltU'-it Pd

i:is

t-l"--it_

,i,.•;c·r.·

t::r'

(i) as a practical matter impair or impede his
ability to protect that interest, or (ii)
leave any of the persons already parties subJect to a substantial risk of incurring double,
multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest.
Under the common law, therefore, as reflected in the
federal rules, complete relief cannot be accorded Price-Orem
Investment, since it had no privity of contract with Rollins,
Brown & Gunnel, and its only course of action would be against
John Price Associates, Inc.

The continuation of the suit

without John Price Associates would also leave Rollins, Brown
& Gunnell subject to a substantial risk of incurring a double

or inconsistent obligation because of the possibility of an
action on its contract with John Price Associates.
As an alternative basis for liability, plaintiff contends
that even in the absence of a contract between it and the
defendant, it may nevertheless recover for negligence.

To

the extent, however, that the defendant's cause of action
sounds in tort, it must fail for lack of duty.
It is axiomatic

that "[a] finding of negligence requires

the presence of certain elements, one of which is a duty running
between the parties."

Hughes v. Housley, 599 P.2d 1250, 1253

(Ct ah 19 7 9) .
In tlusiinell v. Sillitoe, 550 P.2d 1284 (Utah 1976), which
i:1·.'ol•.'ed a

c;

1c.·";in,; error similar to that in the instant case,

property 01v·r1c·rs brc.u·jht an action against the encroaching proµerty

title company, which had also constructed the
l11n11L',

unJ

Lt1e

firm responsible for sur-

property boundary, and as a result,

the defendants'

croached nine feet four inches (9'4")
land.

home en-

into the plaintiffs'

The Bushnell court held that the surveyor "owed no

duty to the adjoining landowners" because the surveyors'
duty "arose out of a contract to survey the premises."
P.2d at 1285.

550

Due to the procedural posture of the case,

the court Vias not presented with the issue which is critical
in the instant case, that of whether the surveyor owed a duty
of care to the landowner.

On that issue, the court simply

stated that "[t]his court has never ruled as to whether there
must be privity of contract between a surveyor and a party
who sustains damage, because of a surveyor's negligent misrepresentation."

550 P.2d at 1286.

The defendant submits that, particularly under the facts
of this case, privity of contract is necessary in order to
find a duty owed by the defendant in performing the survey.
If a contractual relationship did not exist between the defendant and the plaintiff, Price-Orem Investment Company, no
duty existed on the part of Rollins, Brown, & Gunnell toward
Price-Orem Investment, and a cause of action of negligence wiL
not lie.
In its brief, plaintiff cites a Utah case and a Californ:a
case to support his contention that defendant, a surveyor, owe
a duty to plaintiff, owner of the land.

As set forth below,

a review of these cases reveals that they are distinyuishaDle
and the fact that a duty was found in those cases does not
compel a finding of duty in the case at bar.
-22-

Even though the court in Bushnell, supra, expressly left
open the question of duty between a surveyor and a party not
in privity of contract, plaintiff relies on this case as
authority by claiming that the court in its opinion adopted
Restatement of Torts,

2a § 552, which reads as follows:

One who in the course of his business or profession supplies information for the guidance
of others in their business transactions is
subject to liability for harm caused to them
by their reliance upon the information if (a)
he fails to exercise that care and competence
in obtaining and communicating the information
which its recipient is justified in expecting,
and (b) the harm is suffered (i) by the person or one of the class of persons for whose
guidance the information was supplied, and (ii)
because of his justifiable reliance upon it in a
transaction in which it was intended to intluence his conduct or in a transaction substantially identical therewith.
550 P.2d at 1286 4.
From the above-cited language,

it is clear that the

touchstone of this rule is reliance.

One who supplies infor-

rnation is liable only if another relies on the information
and is harmed as a result of that reliance.

Thus,

it appears

that in this narrow context where one supplying information
may have a duty to one not in privity, reliance on the inforrnation is a prerequisite to the existence of that duty.

This

construction is supported not only by the above-cited
Res_t::_aternen_t:_ rule,

but also by the cases cited in plaintiff's

ln M:lliner v.
14(4),

Elmer Fox and Co.,

529 P.2d 806 (Utah

the court denied recovery to plaintiff purchasers of

stock as he:ny part of an unl:rnited class, and stressed the

-c3-

element of reliance in formulating its holding:
We are of the opinion that the lack of privity
is not a defense where an accountant who is
aware of the fact that his work will be relied
on by a party or parties who may extend credit
to his client or assume his client's obligations.
Thus,

592 P.2d at 808 (emphasis added).

it is evident that

the court was willing to waive the privity requirement,

but

only to the extent of allowing recovery by those that the
accountant knew would rely on his information.
The same element of reliance is present i" _K_e_n_t__v_._B_a_r_t_l_e_t:
49 Cal. App.

3d 724, 122 Cal.

Marnul, 43 Ill.
also cites.

Rptr.

615 (1975), and Rozny v.

2d 54, 250 N.E.2d 656 (1969), which the plai1L: I

In both these cases,

as in the i'lstant case,

the

landowners brought actions against the surveyors for damages
resulting from faulty surveys.

However,

the courts held that

the defendants owed a duty to the plaintiffs even though '10
privity was present only because the plai'ltiffs had purchased
their property in reliance on the faulty surveys.
By contrast, the plaintiff i'1 the instant case was not
harmed as a result of reliance on defenda:"lt's survey, because
the plaintiff did not rely 0'1 the survey.
no cause to rely.
evidence,

Indeed,

it had

Furthermore, although there is co'lflicti:i;

it was established at trial that the pla1:itif E k:iew

about the mistake in the survey before a'ly suhsta'.1tial act::"
was taken.

!

I

It is submitted,

therefore,

that the lack of rel'.3

on plaintiff's part prevents these cases from co:itrolli:iy
This is not a case of a LLird ,.arty >ot :•
privity taking some detrime'.1tal actirn in

r»L,:nc»

on defendant's survey,

Plaintiff chose its course of action

with full knowledge of the error in the location of the
building.

In contrast to the plaintiffs in Kent who pur-

chased land relying on the validity of the survey, the
plaintiff in this case was already the owner of the land.
If anyone relied on this survey, it was John Price Associates,
Inc., which ordered the survey and for whose guidance the
survey was made.
If the court follows the elements of Restatement (Second)
of Torts

§

552, even if all of the other elements of the rule

are satisfied, the plaintiff cannot in good faith claim that
it felied on this survey in taking any action and, therefore,
the defendant was not under any duty to the plaintiff.

While

this Court may at some future time extend the duty of surveyors
to those who Justifiably rely on their professional judgment,
it would be manifestly unjust to find such a duty absent reliance.

To do so would be to distort the same rule to achieve

two anomalous results; namely, denying recovery to purchasers
of stock who innocently relied on the information of an
accountant, Milliner, supra, while permitting recovery by a
landm,ncr

exercised no reliance.

Such a result would be

unjust and inconsistent and the defendant respectf" 11

1"

JdC'Stt> that the Court reJect the specious argument in

A•t<<L'tet
r.

Jl1

1'1

L

_'l'

rcedl m1sch1cf of the plaintiff's failure to join

:\S:.,1c13tes

is th.=it

it,

';-

by procrastination or design,

allowed the case to set dormant for more than five years bef,,,,
being activated over the defendant's motion to dismiss for
failure to prosecute.

By that time the pleadings had become

stale, and the defendant had been led to believe that the
plaintiff was not sincere in its claim.

After five years the

defendant could not then raise its defenses or third-party
complaints against John Price Associates, Inc.

Certainly if

the plaintiff's claim is founded in tort, it would be reasonable to compare the negligence of .JPA, which is another good
reason for finding JPA a necessary and indispensable party.
CONCLUSION
The trial court's grant of a new trial should be upheld,
as there was substantial competent evidence which would support
a judgment for the defendant.

No expert or other evidence was

presented to show that the defendant was negligent, and, in
fact, the evidence established that the defendant performed
the staking and survey in accordance with the standards in
the industry.

Substantial evidence showed that the plaintiff

could have cured the problem with a very minimal expenditure
of time and money, but that the plaintiff failed to mitigate
its damages.

Finally, there was substantial competent evidence

that the plaintiff suffered no damage, as the plaintiff did
not have adequate parking for the structures which were
and any additional space would have been in violation of tne
applicable zoning ordinances.

-26-

The trial court's order of dismissal for failure to join
an indispensable party was also correct.

John Price Associates,

Inc., was the only party with whom the defendant had contracted,
and to whom the defendant owed a duty.

The defendant owed no

duty to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff did not reasonably rely
on the work performed by the defendant.
The respondent-defendant therefore respectfully submits
that the trial court's judgment should be affirmed in all
respects.
DATED this

,Jlf.1

day of October, 1983.

, for:
& PETERSEN
Respondent-Defendant
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed two

(2)

true copies of

the foregoing brief to Mr. George A. Hunt and Mr. Bryce D.
Panzer, Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant, 10 Exchange Place,
11th Floor, P.O. Box 3000, Salt Lake City, Utah
postage prepaid, this

->

84110;

day of October, 1983.

